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SMITH, Chief Judge.    
Plaintiffs Dr. Ari Weitzner and his professional 
corporation, Ari Weitzner M.D. P.C., challenge the 
District Court’s conclusion on summary judgment that 
their claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act (TCPA) were untimely.  There is no dispute that 
plaintiffs’ TCPA claims—brought individually and on 
behalf of a proposed class—are untimely unless tolling 
applies.  As a result, the primary question before this 
Court is whether tolling is available under American Pipe 
& Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
American Pipe provides that the timely filing of a 
class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations for 
putative class members until the propriety of maintaining 
the class is determined.  Id. at 554.  This tolling is an 
equitable remedy that promotes both the efficiency and 
economy goals of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by 
encouraging class members to rely on the named 
plaintiff’s filings and protects unnamed class members 
who may have been unaware of the class action.   
Plaintiffs argue that a previous state court putative 
class action brought by Dr. Weitzner, involving the very 
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same claims raised in this case, tolled the statute of 
limitations such that Dr. Weitzner and his P.C. should be 
allowed to pursue their claims anew in federal court.  
Specifically, plaintiffs raise three categories of claims, 
each of which they assert is timely under American Pipe:  
(1) purported class claims; (2) Dr. Weitzner’s individual 
claims; and (3) Weitzner P.C.’s individual claims.  For 
the reasons outlined below, we decline to extend 
American Pipe tolling to each category of plaintiffs’ 
claims and agree with the District Court that plaintiffs’ 
claims are untimely. 
Plaintiffs also challenge the District Court’s 
application of Middle District of Pennsylvania Local 
Rule 56.1.  Finding no error in the District Court’s 
application of the Rule, we will uphold the District 
Court’s ruling on this issue as well. 
I. BACKGROUND1 
Dr. Ari Weitzner is a physician who maintains a 
practice in New York.  Dr. Weitzner is, and has always 
been, the sole shareholder of co-plaintiff Weitzner P.C.  
                                                 
1 On review of a grant of summary judgment, we 
view the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as 
the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences in their 
favor.  Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
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During the events at issue in this case, Dr. Weitzner 
practiced through the P.C.  At the present time, the P.C. 
has neither assets nor any ongoing business, yet remains 
legally active under New York law.   
On April 21, 2004 and March 22, 2005, Sanofi 
Pasteur, Inc., the vaccines division of the pharmaceutical 
company Sanofi, and VaxServe, Inc., a healthcare 
supplier, sent two unsolicited faxes to a fax machine 
located in Dr. Weitzner’s office.  Based on the receipt of 
these two faxes, Dr. Weitzner filed a putative class action 
against Sanofi Pasteur and VaxServe in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.  
In the state court action, Dr. Weitzner alleged that 
defendants transmitted thousands of faxes in violation of 
the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), including at least 
one fax sent to Dr. Weitzner.  The proposed class 
included all individuals “who received an unsolicited 
facsimile advertisement from defendants between 
January 2, 2001[,] and the date of the resolution of this 
lawsuit.”  On June 27, 2008, the Court of Common Pleas 
denied class certification,2 after which the case proceeded 
as an individual action by Dr. Weitzner against 
                                                 
2 The Court of Common Pleas explained that its 
class certification decision was made in the context of the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and not in the 
context of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1707 
regarding a motion for certification of a class action.   
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defendants.  There has yet to be a final judgment in the 
state court case.  It is undisputed that defendants stopped 
sending unsolicited faxes in April 2005.   
More than three years after denial of class 
certification in the state action, and over six years after 
defendants sent any unsolicited faxes, Plaintiffs filed this 
case in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on November 
26, 2011.  Plaintiffs brought individual claims based on 
the same two faxes sent on April 21, 2004, and March 
22, 2005, along with class claims substantially similar to 
those alleged in the state court action.3   
The District Court concluded that the four-year 
federal default statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1658 applies to claims under the TCPA.  On appeal, the 
parties do not dispute the application of the four-year 
statute of limitations.  The statute of limitations for 
claims arising from the two faxes actually sent to 
plaintiffs therefore ran in 2008 and 2009, respectively, 
and the statute of limitations for any class claims had 
                                                 
3 Defendants moved in the District Court for 
abstention under Colorado River Water Conservation 
District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), based on 
the pending state court action.  The District Court denied 
the motion, and the parties did not raise this issue on 
appeal.   
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similarly elapsed by April 2009.4  Accordingly, there is 
no dispute that all of these claims are untimely absent 
tolling.  Plaintiffs rely on Dr. Weitzner’s 2005 state court 
action—in which Dr. Weitzner initiated suit as the named 
plaintiff in a putative class action and which he continues 
to pursue on an individual basis—as the means for tolling 
the statute of limitations as Dr. Weitzner and his P.C. 
attempt to bring the same claims in the District Court.  
Defendants moved for summary judgment on 
statute of limitations grounds and filed an accompanying 
                                                 
4 The two faxes received by plaintiffs were sent on 
April 21, 2004, and March 22, 2005, respectively.  
Plaintiffs concede that defendants sent no faxes after 
April 2005.  Accordingly, the statute of limitations for 
plaintiffs’ individual claims based on the first fax and 
second fax expired on April 21, 2008, and March 22, 
2009, respectively.  The statute of limitations for any 
class claims expired in April 2009. 
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statement of material facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1.5  
Plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment and their answer to defendants’ 
statement of material facts.  Defendants moved to strike 
plaintiffs’ answer to the statement of facts for 
noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1.  Defendants 
argued, in part, that portions of the answer were 
argumentative in violation of Local Rule 56.1.   
The District Court granted defendants’ motion to 
strike plaintiffs’ answer to the statement of facts in part, 
                                                 
5 Local Rule 56.1 provides: “A motion for 
summary judgment filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.56, 
shall be accompanied by a separate, short and concise 
statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, 
as to which the moving party contends there is no 
genuine issue to be tried. The papers opposing a motion 
for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and 
concise statement of the material facts, responding to the 
numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required 
in the foregoing paragraph, as to which it is contended 
that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.  Statements 
of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a 
motion shall include references to the parts of the record 
that support the statements.  All material facts set forth in 
the statement required to be served by the moving party 
will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the 
statement required to be served by the opposing party.” 
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striking 19 responses from the answer for noncompliance 
with Local Rule 56.1 because they were not concise and 
were argumentative.  In the same order, the District Court 
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that American Pipe tolling did not apply to 
plaintiffs’ class or individual claims and that plaintiffs’ 
claims were therefore untimely.  Plaintiffs filed a timely 
notice of appeal.6  
II. APPLICATION OF AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the 
District Court correctly concluded that plaintiffs’ claims 
were not subject to American Pipe tolling and were 
therefore untimely.  We review orders granting summary 
judgment de novo.  Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 
382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017).  We may affirm the District 
Court on any grounds supported by the record.  Nicini v. 
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
Under American Pipe, the timely filing of a class 
action tolls the applicable statute of limitations for 
putative class members.  Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 
U.S. at 554.  The Supreme Court held:  “[T]he 
commencement of a class action suspends the applicable 
                                                 
6 The District Court had federal question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the 
class who would have been parties[7] had the suit been 
permitted to continue as a class action.”  Id.  The 
Supreme Court has since clarified that American Pipe 
tolling is an equitable remedy, “designed to modify a 
statutory time bar where its rigid application would 
create injustice.”  Cal. Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., 
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2052 (2017).   
Of course, “[p]laintiffs have no substantive right to 
bring their claims outside the statute of limitations.”  
China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 
1800, 1810 (2018).  Instead, any ability to do so is based 
only on this “judicially crafted tolling rule.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the tolling rule need not be applied 
mechanically.  And it should not be applied where doing 
so would result in an abuse of American Pipe.  Cf. 
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 
                                                 
7 American Pipe was decided in 1974, at a time 
when courts were still gaining familiarity with the 
modern class action.  The Court’s use of the term 
“parties” is imprecise, as unnamed class members are not 
technically “parties” even where a class has been 
certified.  Nevertheless, the Court’s intent is clear, and, as 
we discuss below, subsequent decisions have clarified 
that American Pipe tolling applies to putative unnamed 
class members. 
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(1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The tolling rule of 
American Pipe is a generous one, inviting abuse.”).   
Given the nature of plaintiffs’ claims, we are 
tasked with answering three discrete questions to 
determine whether any of plaintiffs’ claims are timely:  
(1) whether tolling applies to plaintiffs’ class claims; (2) 
whether tolling applies to Dr. Weitzner’s individual 
claims, given his status as a named plaintiff in the state 
court action; and (3) whether tolling applies to Weitzner 
P.C.’s individual claims, given the P.C.’s connection to 
Dr. Weitzner. 
A. Application of American Pipe to 
Plaintiffs’ Class Claims 
The first question is the easiest to resolve.  
Subsequent to the District Court’s ruling, the Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. 
1800, clarifying that American Pipe tolling does not 
allow a putative class member to commence a new class 
action outside of the statute of limitations:  
American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations 
during the pendency of a putative class 
action, allowing unnamed class members to 
join the action individually or file individual 
claims if the class fails. But American Pipe 
does not permit the maintenance of a follow-
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on class action past expiration of the statute 
of limitations.   
Id. at 1804.  As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he 
‘efficiency and economy of litigation’ that support tolling 
of individual claims, Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 
553, do not support maintenance of untimely successive 
class actions.”  China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1806.  
Further, as the Supreme Court recognized, if the 
limitations period for subsequent class claims was also 
tolled, the time for filing class suits “could be limitless.”  
Id. at 1809.  American Pipe tolling thus permits putative 
class members to file only individual claims after a denial 
of class certification.8 
In reaching this conclusion, the China Agritech 
Court rejected this Court’s approach in Yang v. Odom, 
392 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2004).  In Yang, we held that 
American Pipe tolling did not apply to successive class 
actions where certification was previously denied due to 
a substantive class defect, but did apply where 
                                                 
8 Despite plaintiffs’ contention to the contrary, the 
Supreme Court’s broad pronouncement defeats any 
argument that the China Agritech rule should apply only 
to unnamed class members.  There is no logical reason 
for named plaintiffs—who have already brought a class 
action—to be permitted to bring successive class actions 
after class certification has been denied, where putative 
class members cannot do so. 
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certification was denied based on a putative 
representative’s deficiencies.  Id. at 104.  The Supreme 
Court expressly rejected this distinction:  
Justice SOTOMAYOR suggests that the Court 
might adopt a rule under which tolling 
“becomes unavailable for future class claims 
where class certification is denied for a reason 
that bears on the suitability of the claims for 
class treatment,” but not where “class 
certification is denied because of the 
deficiencies of the lead plaintiff as class 
representative.” But Rule 23 contains no 
instruction to give denials of class certification 
different effect based on the reason for the 
denial.   
China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1809 n.5 (internal citations 
omitted).  Accordingly, we recognize the abrogation of 
Yang v. Odom on this point.9   
Because plaintiffs’ class claims are untimely 
absent tolling, and China Agritech precludes the 
application of American Pipe tolling to such successive 
class claims, we conclude that plaintiffs’ class claims are 
not subject to tolling and are therefore untimely. 
                                                 
9 Yang’s holding that American Pipe tolling ends 
on the day the trial court denies class certification was 
not affected by China Agritech and continues to be 
authoritative.  See Yang, 392 F.3d at 102. 
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B. Application of American Pipe to Dr. 
Weitzner’s Individual Claims 
The question of whether American Pipe applies to 
Dr. Weitzner’s individual claims is less straightforward 
than the issue of its application to follow-on class 
actions.  Dr. Weitzner initiated the state court action as a 
named plaintiff in that putative class action.  American 
Pipe is designed to protect individual claims filed after 
the denial of class certification, but the Supreme Court 
did not specify whether tolling should protect named 
plaintiffs as well as unnamed plaintiffs.  Indeed, the 
Court included no express restrictions in the broad 
language it used to describe the claims to which tolling 
would apply:  “[T]he commencement of a class action 
suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all 
asserted members of the class who would have been 
parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class 
action.”  Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 554.  On 
initial review, American Pipe’s broad language would 
seem to provide for tolling of the claims of both named 
plaintiffs and unnamed putative class members in the 
initial class action.  The purpose of American Pipe tolling 
and subsequent decisions, however, make clear that 
tolling does not protect named plaintiffs.   
There were two primary purposes underlying the 
Supreme Court’s holding in American Pipe.  First, the 
Court emphasized the “efficiency and economy of 
litigation” purposes of Rule 23 as a basis for the tolling 
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rule because, without such a rule, “[p]otential class 
members would be induced to file protective motions to 
intervene or join.”  Id. at 553.  This concern does not 
apply to named plaintiffs, who have already filed their 
claims; neither efficiency nor economy would be 
advanced by allowing named plaintiffs to rely on their 
own filings.  To the extent a named plaintiff could file 
claims in multiple jurisdictions, plaintiffs are often tasked 
with deciding between multiple jurisdictions when 
bringing claims.  Where a plaintiff can bring multiple 
putative class claims simultaneously, efficiency interests 
and judicial comity actually support the plaintiff’s filing 
all claims as soon as possible.  See China Agritech, 138 
S. Ct. at 1811 (“Multiple timely filings might not line up 
neatly . . . .  But district courts have ample tools at their 
disposal to manage the suits, including the ability to stay, 
consolidate, or transfer proceedings.”). 
Second, the Supreme Court emphasized the need 
for tolling to protect the interests of putative unnamed 
class members who had not received notice and were 
unaware of the pending class action.  The Court 
described the “passive beneficiar[y]” status of potential 
class members, explaining that they have no obligation to 
“take note of the suit or to exercise any responsibility 
with respect to it” until the existence of the class has been 
established.  Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 552.  
Again, this interest supports tolling only for unnamed 
class members.  Named plaintiffs are necessarily aware 
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of the pending litigation and will be made aware of any 
denial of class certification such that tolling is 
unnecessary to protect their interests.  Indeed, a named 
plaintiff’s individual claim will remain viable upon 
denial of class certification because the putative class 
action is then simply transformed into an individual 
action. 
The Supreme Court has confirmed that the purpose 
of American Pipe tolling is that “unnamed plaintiffs 
should be treated as though they had been named 
plaintiffs during the pendency of the class action,” with 
their rights protected accordingly.  Chardon v. Fumero 
Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 659 (1983) (emphasis added).  
Multiple Supreme Court opinions have since described 
the American Pipe rule as applying to only unnamed 
class members.  See, e.g., China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 
1804 (“American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations 
during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing 
unnamed class members to join the action individually or 
file individual claims if the class fails.” (emphasis 
added)); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313 n.10 
(2011) (describing American Pipe as demonstrating that 
“a person not a party to a class suit may receive certain 
benefits (such as the tolling of a limitations period) 
related to that proceeding”); Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 
U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (citing American Pipe for the 
proposition that “[n]onnamed class members are, for 
instance, parties in the sense that the filing of an action 
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on behalf of the class tolls a statute of limitations against 
them”); Chardon, 462 U.S. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“The question in American Pipe was whether 
the pendency of this class action warranted tolling of the 
Clayton Act’s limitations period as to unnamed plaintiffs 
in the class.”).   
Given the equitable nature of American Pipe 
tolling, we discern no reason to extend its reach to named 
plaintiffs.  Allowing named plaintiffs to file new 
individual claims outside the statute of limitations—
when they can instead pursue their original, timely filed 
individual claims in the first case, after class certification 
has been denied—serves no legitimate purpose.  Quite 
simply, no injustice results from denying those parties 
tolling.  To the contrary, allowing an individual to file 
repetitive claims outside the statute of limitations would 
be an abuse of American Pipe and contrary to its 
underlying policy.   
Accordingly, we hold that American Pipe does not 
toll the statute of limitations for named plaintiffs such as 
Dr. Weitzner.  We therefore conclude that his individual 
claims in this case are untimely. 
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C. Application of American Pipe to Weitzner 
P.C.’s Individual Claims 
Given the facts of this case, we conclude that the 
same reasoning applicable to Dr. Weitzner bars the P.C.’s 
individual claims.  The rationale underlying American 
Pipe tolling does not apply to Weitzner P.C., so applying 
it here would constitute an abuse of American Pipe. 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in American Pipe 
does not extend to Weitzner P.C.  Although Weitzner 
P.C. may have been a putative class member in Dr. 
Weitzner’s state court action, it was not the type of 
unaware, absent class member American Pipe was 
designed to protect.10  Dr. Weitzner has always been the 
sole shareholder of Weitzner P.C., so there can be no 
dispute that Weitzner P.C. received actual notice of the 
pending state court action and of the denial of class 
certification in that case.  Yet Weitzner P.C. took no 
steps to pursue its claims within the statute of limitations 
and waited over three years following the denial of class 
certification to first bring its claims.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Weitzner P.C. is not entitled to the benefit 
                                                 
10 Dr. Weitzner testified in 2006 that, apart from 
this case and the related state case, he had filed 17 other 
lawsuits under the TCPA.  Some of these lawsuits were 
filed on behalf of Dr. Weitzner individually, while the 
P.C. was the plaintiff in other cases.  As a result, the P.C. 
itself is an experienced TCPA litigant. 
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of American Pipe equitable tolling.  See China Agritech, 
138 S. Ct. at 1808 (“Ordinarily, to benefit from equitable 
tolling, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have been 
diligent in pursuit of their claims.”). 
Tolling Weitzner P.C.’s individual claims would 
also result in an abuse of American Pipe.  Having always 
been the sole shareholder of Weitzner P.C., Dr. Weitzner 
did business through the P.C. during the time periods at 
issue here.  The same two faxes allegedly sent in 
violation of the TCPA form the bases of both Dr. 
Weitzner and Weitzner P.C.’s claims.  Any judgment in 
favor of Weitzner P.C.—a nonoperational, but legally 
active corporation—would benefit only Dr. Weitzner.  
Given the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims and the close 
relationship between Dr. Weitzner and Weitzner P.C., 
applying American Pipe tolling to Weitzner P.C.’s claims 
would effectively allow Dr. Weitzner to pursue his 
claims for a second time outside the statute of limitations, 
despite our conclusion that tolling does not apply to Dr. 
Weitzner’s personal claims.   
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that 
American Pipe tolling does not apply to any of plaintiffs’ 
claims, and such claims are therefore barred as untimely.  
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III. LOCAL RULE 56.1 
To address plaintiffs’ second claim on appeal—
that the District Court erred in striking portions of their 
answer to the statement of facts under Middle District of 
Pennsylvania Local Rule 56.1—we must first determine 
what standard of review to apply to a district court’s 
application of its own local rules.  We have previously 
held that an appellate court “owes deference to a district 
court’s interpretation of its local rules.”  Gov’t of V.I. v. 
Mills, 634 F.3d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 2011).  We now clarify 
that a district court’s application and interpretation of its 
own local rules should generally be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.11  “An abuse of discretion may occur as a 
result of an errant conclusion of law, an improper 
application of law to fact, or a clearly erroneous finding 
of fact.”  McDowell v. Phila. Hous. Auth. (PHA), 423 
F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).  We see no abuse of 
discretion here. 
Under Local Rule 56.1, a party must file a separate 
statement of material facts along with any motion for 
summary judgment.  M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.  A party 
opposing summary judgment must file a corresponding 
answer to the statement of material facts, responding to 
                                                 
11 Some exceptions exist.  For example, where the local 
rules are substantively identical to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, we apply a plenary standard of 
review.  See Mills, 634 F.3d at 750.  
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the moving party’s filing.  Id.  Where an opposing party 
fails to object in its answer, those facts in the moving 
party’s statement are considered admitted.  Id. 
Local Rule 56.1 was promulgated to bring greater 
efficiency to the work of the judges of the Middle 
District.  As opinions from that Court have explained, the 
Rule “is essential to the Court’s resolution of a summary 
judgment motion” due to its role in “organizing the 
evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating 
precisely how each side proposed to prove a disputed fact 
with admissible evidence.” Kramer v. Peerless Indem. 
Ins. Co., No. 3:CV-08-2096, 2010 WL 11553711, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2010); see also Hartshorn v. Throop 
Borough, No. CIV.A. 3:07-CV-01333, 2009 WL 761270, 
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2009) (“The purpose of this rule 
is to structure a party’s summary judgment legal and 
factual theory into a format that permits and facilitates 
the court’s direct and accurate consideration of the 
motion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Accordingly, the District Court is in the best position to 
determine the extent of a party’s noncompliance with 
Local Rule 56.1, as well as the appropriate sanction for 
such noncompliance.  An abuse of discretion standard of 
review is therefore wholly appropriate. 
Plaintiffs here primarily argue that the District 
Court erred by striking entire paragraphs of their answer 
to the statement of facts where only a portion was 
noncompliant with Local Rule 56.1.  They further 
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suggest that the District Court should have allowed 
plaintiffs to refile, rather than deeming defendants’ 
uncontroverted facts admitted.  Under these 
circumstances, the District Court’s decision to employ 
any given sanction—out of the many possible sanctions 
available to it—is fully within the discretion of that 
Court.  Plaintiffs offer no persuasive reason for us to 
disturb the District Court’s conclusion that portions of 
plaintiffs’ answer to the statement of facts were not 
concise and were argumentative in violation of Local 
Rule 56.1.  Nor does the District Court’s decision to 
strike the portions it concluded were noncompliant, 
rather than choosing to employ a more forgiving 
sanction, constitute an abuse of discretion.  It is beyond 
question that the District Court has the authority to strike 
filings that fail to comply with its local rules. 
Finally, though the District Court was still required 
to conduct a full analysis to determine whether granting 
summary judgment was appropriate, we find no error in 
the District Court’s Rule 56 analysis, which fully 
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addressed plaintiffs’ factual allegations.12  See Anchorage 
Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in applying Local Rule 56.1. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
American Pipe created a generous tolling rule that 
applies broadly to protect putative class members in 
pending class actions.  Yet the rule is not without limits.  
As the Supreme Court clarified in China Agritech, tolling 
does not apply to successive class actions under any 
circumstances.  We now hold that American Pipe tolling 
does not allow individuals who were named plaintiffs in 
an initial class action to toll their own statute of 
limitations.  We emphasize that American Pipe tolling 
has long been recognized as an equitable remedy that 
applies only where necessary to prevent injustice.  Courts 
should not permit tolling where doing so would result in 
an abuse of American Pipe.  As a result, American Pipe 
does not apply to preserve any of plaintiffs’ untimely 
                                                 
12 Even if the District Court’s application of Local 
Rule 56.1 were improper, plaintiffs fail to identify any 
prejudicial error.  Plaintiffs do not identify any stricken 
statement that would have affected the District Court’s 
conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims were untimely.  
Accordingly, we conclude that any error as to Local Rule 
56.1 was harmless. 
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claims.  Finally, we conclude that the District Court’s 
application of Local Rule 56.1 was not an abuse of 
discretion and, in any event, had no effect on its 
appropriate grant of summary judgment.  We will 
therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  
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